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Abstract
Public enforcement of law relies on the use of public agents, such as judges,
to follow the law. Are judges motivated only by strategic interests and ideol-
ogy, as many models posit, rather than a duty to follow the law? We use the
random assignment of U.S. Federal judges setting geographically-local prece-
dent to document the causal impact of court decisions in a hierarchical legal
system. We examine lower court cases filed before and resolved after higher
court decisions and find that lower courts are 29-37% points more likely to rule
in the manner of the higher court. The results obtain when the higher court
case was decided in the same doctrinal area as the pending case and when the
higher court case was decided on the merits. Reversals by the higher court
have no significant effects. These results provide clean evidence that judges are
motivated to follow the law and are not solely motivated by policy preferences.
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1 Introduction
Public enforcement of law relies on the use of public agents to follow the law. The
earliest economically-oriented writing on this subject dates from Montesquieu (1749)
and Bentham (1789) and interest in the motivations of public agents has renewed
since Becker (1968). In recent decades, economists (Miceli and Cos¸gel, 1994), judges
(Posner, 1993), and political scientists (Segal and Spaeth, 1993; Spaeth and Segal,
2001) have speculated on the drivers of judges’ decisions, re-interpreting behavior as
self-interested rather than as motivated out of duty. At the same time, there has been
an expansion of the domain of preferences considered by economic theory. There is
the homo-oeconomics view – that people are only motivated by material consequences
of their decisions on their own payoffs. Confronted with mounting lab evidence that
people are consistently nice (pro-social) in economic games, the models were expanded
so that people have pro-social motives about justice and fairness (Rabin, 1993; Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999). Similarly, principal-agent theory has expanded to include agents
whose intrinsic motivations align with that of the principals (Be´nabou and Tirole,
2006). Both incentives (Ferejohn, 1986; Alesina and Tabellini, 2007; Dewatripont
et al., 1999) and prosociality (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2011) can motivate public agents,
but clean evidence of public agents motivated out of duty remains scarce. The primary
difficulty that arises in attempting to observe this evidence is the selection of tasks
before the agent. We investigate whether judges follow the law and if so, why, in the
context of the U.S. Federal Courts, where judges have life-tenure and fixed salaries
and where tasks are randomly assigned.
The decision-making powers of public agents can have large impacts, yet their
pecuniary rewards are only weakly incentivized by design (Epstein et al., 2013). Clas-
sical conceptions of judge behavior suggest that following the law is the main driver
of judges’ decisions. But a large empirical literature has documented the seeming im-
portance of ideology, uncovering consistent differences in the way judges decide cases,
particularly along political lines (Segal and Spaeth, 1993; Sunstein et al., 2006). While
this is often interpreted as a “preferentialist” conception of legal decision-making (i.e.,
judges make decisions to achieve policy outcomes rather than to follow the law), one
can argue for alternate interpretations: judges might be following what they perceive
to be “the law”, even if differences in their legal philosophies (i.e., perceived duties)
lead them to consistently decide cases differently. For instance, a judge can derive—
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deontologically—from first principles an adherence to a strict interpretation of the
Constitution, while not necessarily hewing to the consequentialist preferences of a
political party for a certain policy outcome. Attempts to document the influence of
“legal” factors such as the creation of precedent or changes in statutory law on judges’
decisions have remained scarce (Spaeth and Segal, 2001; Cross, 2005; Gilbert, 2011;
Fischman, 2015) and are difficult for several reasons. We propose and implement a
methodology that provides clean evidence that judges are motivated to follow the law
and are not solely motivated by policy preferences.
The great econometric challenge behind knowing whether judges follow the law is
at least five-pronged. In a seminal contribution, Priest and Klein (1984) first pointed
out that plaintiffs and defendants bargain under the shadow of the law, so the plain-
tiff win rate reveals no information about the underlying strength of precedent. This
insight effectively ended a research agenda that correlated real outcomes with mea-
sures of law to infer the real effects of laws. Second, as all law students are taught
[to make nuanced analogies], there is extensive cross-fertilization of legal doctrine
between different areas of law via analogies. Roe v. Wade extended the right of
privacy under the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which was previously in-
terpreted as precluding government interference in freedom of contract, but Roe v.
Wade interpreted Due Process as precluding government interference in a woman’s
decision to have an abortion. With cross-fertilization, real outcomes may be misat-
tributed to one legal rule when many legal rules are changing simultaneously. The
conventional approach would be to control for other legal rules, but it is practically
infeasible to code–much less select–all the possible related doctrinal areas. Third, in
another seminal contribution, Besley and Case (2000) cautioned against causal in-
terpretation of correlations between real outcomes and laws because constituents can
influence policies. This concern is a particularly trenchant for court cases (Klarman,
2005), because the legal doctrine often instructs judges to take account the commu-
nity standards, i.e., norms, so it will be difficult to distinguish between laws causing
economic changes from economic changes causing laws. A variant of the second and
third concern is that judges are consequentialist (Chen and Schonger, 2013, 2015):
They take into account the potential consequences of their decisions–at least some
judges on both the left (Breyer, 2006) and right (Posner, 1998) do–which can bias
the correlation between future outcomes and today’s decisions if they desire similar
consequences while sitting on other cases. We overcome these three challenges with
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random variation in legal precedent using biographical characteristics of judges: We
cannot ask judges to randomize their decisions in the interest of legal science, but the
judges themselves are randomly assigned and their background correlates with the
way they decide, effectively creating a clinical trial that randomizes jurisprudence.
The fourth challenge in measuring the effects of legal precedent on judicial de-
cisions is the selection of litigation under the shadow of the law after a precedent
has been issued. Recent theoretical models view courts as continually shifting the
legal standard (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007). In deciding issues of law, common
law courts provide new interpretations or distinctions of pre-existing precedents or
statutes. These new distinctions expand or contract the space under which an actor
is found liable. Under these theoretical models, plaintiff win rates imply increasingly
favorable laws for the plaintiff. However, under Priest and Klein (1984), defendants
should be more likely to settle in response. Thus, judges decide on different types of
cases before and after a legal precedent, making it challenging to have clean evidence
of the effect of law on judicial decision-making. We overcome the fourth challenge by
examining the impact of higher court case resolutions on pending lower court cases
in the jurisdiction of the higher courts.
The fifth challenge is to find an area of law that occurs with high frequency
in both the higher and lower courts and where all lower court filings are observed.
Fortunately, the centrality of piercing the corporate veil in U.S. business law allows
such an analysis. Piercing the corporate veil has been dubbed the “most litigated
issue in corporate law” (Thompson, 1991). It is a legal remedy allowing a creditor of
a corporation to hold its shareholders liable for the debt of the corporation. We have
obtained all filings where plaintiffs attempt to pierce the corporate veil in the Federal
Courts. We investigate the impact of Circuit Court judgments on the decisions of
District Court judges and litigants in ongoing proceedings before the District Courts.
By linking corporate veil piercing pleadings before the U.S. District Courts with
administrative data on District case outcomes and all Circuit Court cases decided
while the case was pending, we can examine cases that were initiated before a Circuit
decision but were decided after a Circuit decision to control for selection into litigation.
We collect and assemble unique data: piercing the corporate veil decisions in U.S.
Circuit Courts, District Court pleadings (using the Westlaw pleadings database), and
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Civil Terminations (AOC) database,
which contains information on every case litigated before the U.S. Federal District
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Courts. This allows us to construct a database of District Court decisions that were
filed before, but decided after the appellate decisions were submitted, thereby holding
constant the case sample and eliminating any effect of the selection of cases for liti-
gation (Hubbard, 2013). We further solve the issues of reverse causality and omitted
variables by instrumenting for the direction of the resolution of the appellate cases
using the random assignment of appellate judges. Moreover, the richness of the AOC
database allows us to examine the impact of appellate court decisions on the dura-
tion of District Court cases. Particularly, it allows us to investigate whether litigants,
incorporating the new judicial standard in deciding which litigated cases to bring to
trial, are more likely to settle a case after a Circuit Court judgment.
We find a strong relationship between Circuit Court decisions and ensuing District
Court decisions. After Circuit Court decisions voting to pierce, District Courts are
29-37% points more likely to pierce. The effect is observed in the raw data and
with the instrumental variables strategy. The effects are due to Circuit decisions
litigated in the same area of law as the pending District case and when the Circuit
decision reached a judgment on the merits. We observe no increase in settlement after
Circuit decisions, suggesting that litigants, a large part of whose litigation costs have
already been sunk, are not settling in response to the new decision standard. This
suggests that the behavioral changes are due to the judges themselves. Finally, we
observe no significant impact of Circuit Court reversals separate from the precedent
itself, suggesting that reversal aversion is not the main driver. These results are
inconsistent with a purely legal realist view of judicial decision-making where judges
are only motivated by policy preferences.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains infor-
mation on the institutional background of the U.S. Federal Courts system, piercing
the corporate veil, and describes the data. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy.
Section 4 discusses the results as well as their implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 Research Design
2.1 U.S. Federal Courts
This study investigates the behavior of judges in the U.S. Federal Court system. Our
identification strategy relies on a number of specific features of this system in order
to infer the causal relationship between judgments at different courts. Therefore,
5
we explain in some depth the institutional features against which this study is set.
The role of judges in a common law system does not only consist of applying the
law. Instead, judges, through the setting of binding precedent, also make the law.
Precedent created by the Supreme Court is legally binding for all Federal Courts.
Similarly, precedent created by a Circuit Court is legally binding for future decisions
of the same court and lower courts (most importantly, the District Courts) in the
same Circuit.
The U.S. Federal Courts system consists of three levels, with the Supreme Court
of the United States as its highest court, the United States Circuit Courts as interme-
diate courts, and the United States District Courts as trial courts. The system also
features a number of judicial bodies with jurisdiction over special subject matters, for
example, the bankruptcy courts that exist in each District. In the judicial hierarchy,
the bankruptcy courts are placed below the District Courts. Generally, the jurisdic-
tional boundaries are geographical, with each of the 94 District Courts hearing cases
related to its District, and the 12 Circuit Courts hearing appeals against the deci-
sions of the District Courts located in their Circuits. Figure 1 shows the geographical
boundaries of Circuits and Districts.
District Courts act as trial courts for most cases that are brought before the
Federal Courts. As trial courts, their task consists of both establishing the facts of
the case and applying the law to the facts. Furthermore, they hear appeals against
decisions of those judicial bodies that are placed below them in the judicial hierarchy,
e.g., the bankruptcy courts. Overall, District Courts hear hundreds of thousands of
cases each year. For example, in 2000, more than 250,000 cases were brought before
the District Courts. Between 10 to 20% of these are appealed to the Circuit Courts.
Decisions by the District Courts are subject to appeal to the Circuit Courts.
Circuit Courts operate under a system of mandatory review. This means they must
hear all appeals from the lower courts. Unlike the District Courts, Circuit Courts
will normally refrain from reassessing the factual side of the case. Instead, Circuit
Courts review questions of law. If the Circuit Court finds a mistake by the District
Court, the Circuit Court will normally reverse the decision of the District Court, and
remand the case to the District Court. Then, the District Court is obliged to retry
the case, or proceed with it in accordance with the guidance offered by the Circuit
Court. Less than 1% of the cases at the Circuit Courts are reviewed by the Supreme
Court, which hears only those cases it considers particularly important. Therefore,
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for many cases, the appellate level is the final level of adjudication on legal issues.
Accordingly, the courts of appeals play an important role in creating new law.
In a hierarchical legal system, public agents balance their own policy preferences
against the duty to follow the principal in the higher courts. Clean evidence of these
factors remains a subject of debate.1 A first-order difficulty that arises in attempting
to answer that question is that the preferences of the public agent and principal are
likely to be correlated with unobservable characteristics of the public agent’s task. In
both the District and the Circuit Courts, cases are randomly assigned to 1 (District
Court) and 3 (Circuit Court) judges, respectively.2 Given that individual judges may
decide cases differently, the outcome of a case – and, accordingly, the creation of
new law – depends at least partly on a random element. Sunstein et al. (2006), for
example, investigate how Democrat and Republican judges differ in their decision
making. Interestingly, they find differences in the decision standards not only for
“political” areas of law, but also for piercing the corporate veil cases, and it is this
variation that we will use in our instrumental variables strategy.
2.2 Piercing the corporate veil
Piercing the corporate veil (PCV) is a legal remedy allowing a creditor of a corporation
to hold its shareholders liable for the debt of the corporation. As a default, under U.S.
corporate law, a corporation is treated as a legal entity separate from its shareholder.
This means that the corporation is solely responsible for any debt it incurs, and the
shareholder or parent company is shielded from paying for the debts of his corporation
by the “veil” of limited liability. If the assets of the corporation are insufficient to pay
its debts, a creditor might want to recover the debt from the shareholder or parent
company, which might have deeper pockets than the corporation itself. When the
requirements for piercing the corporate veil are met, a creditor is allowed to recover
his claims from the corporation’s shareholders. PCV is an important institute in
American corporate law. In fact, it has been dubbed the “most litigated issue in
corporate law” (Thompson, 1991). Claims for piercing the corporate veil are raised
1Other factors with clean evidence among public agents include priming (Berdejo´ and Chen,
2014), gambler’s fallacy (Chen et al., 2015), mood (Chen and Spamann, 2014), collegial pressure
(Chen et al., 2015), and legitimacy (Chen, 2013).
2At the Circuit Courts, en banc review of the decision by the full number of judges is possible,
but rare. Regarding random assignment, we refer the reader to tests of random assignment of judges
in cases on sexual harassment (Chen and Sethi, 2012), eminent domain (Chen and Yeh, 2013), free
speech (Chen and Yeh, 2012), and abortion (Chen et al., 2012).
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in a variety of settings. Important areas of application include contracts and torts
claims as well as claims from regulatory regimes such as ERISA3 and CERCLA.4 PCV
is not limited to recovering monetary claims from the shareholders of a company. For
example, it can also be invoked to force a company into arbitration when an existing
arbitration agreement was not signed by the company itself, but by an affiliate.
The legal requirements for piercing the corporate veil are often formulated as
multi-factored tests. There are, however, no clear decision rules in the sense of clearly
identified necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a court to pierce the veil. Instead,
while courts take into account a number of different issues, in the end judges have
discretion in deciding whether PCV is required to achieve a “just” result. Some of
the factors cited as important across cases are (see Macey and Mitts 2014 for a more
comprehensive overview):
• Undercapitalization of the corporation
• Failure to observe corporate formalities
• No clear separation between the activities and the assets of the corporation and
its shareholder/mother company
• “Sham” corporations
For decades, scholars criticized the state of PCV doctrine as unsatisfactory. Since
the legal doctrine is considered obscure and misleading, court decisions are viewed as
unpredictable and incomprehensible.5 Legal scholars have reacted in two ways: Some
have attempted to understand the “real” motives behind decisions to pierce the veil
using statistics (Thompson, 1991; Hodge and Sachs, 2008; Matheson, 2009; McPher-
son and Raja, 2010). Others have tried to formulate comprehensive guidelines when
to pierce based on economic theory, arguing that the courts followed a hidden ratio-
nale such as reducing “the social cost of limited liability” by piercing “the corporate
veil in situations where the incentive to engage in excessively risky activities is the
greatest” (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1985), reallocation of resources to entrepreneurs
3The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub.L. 93406, 88 Stat. 829.
4The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, P.L.
96-510, 94 Stat. 2767.
5See only Thompson (1991); Macey and Mitts (2014).
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(Millon, 2007), or bringing “corporate actors behavior into conformity with a partic-
ular statutory scheme”, remedying fraudulent activity, and maximizing “the value of
an insolvent company for the benefit of all of the creditors” (Macey and Mitts, 2014).
Piercing the corporate veil is not the only legal doctrine that can be invoked to
hold a person or entity responsible for the debts of a related corporate debtor. Alter
ego, instrumentality theory, single business theory, agency, succession in interest and
unjust enrichment are prominent examples of alternative remedies available to the
creditor seeking to hold other entities responsible for a corporation’s debts. However,
some of these instruments are more closely related to PCV than others. Similar to
piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, instrumentality theory, and single business the-
ory rely on equitable considerations. They require answering the question whether,
given the way in which the interests and activities of the shareholder and company
were aligned, it is appropriate to allow a shareholder to hide behind the “shield”
of limited liability. In line with that, courts usually do not draw a sharp distinc-
tion between these instruments. This is not true for agency, unjust enrichment, and
succession of interest. Agency and unjust enrichment do not require an analysis of
the prior conduct of the shareholder vis-a`-vis the corporation. While this distinction
might be not as clear-cut for succession in interest, the rationale between both in-
struments is still different. In line with that, courts usually draw a clear line between
one of these remedies and PCV, refusing to test the fulfillment of the requirements of
PCV in cases where the plaintiff has based his claim on one of the other institutes.
In sum, the law is unclear, leaving room for interpretation and judicial discretion,
which makes it likely that judges may systematically come to different conclusions
about what the right and just thing to do is for any particular case. In addition,
plaintiffs have a multitude of litigation strategies, which highlight the importance of
holding fixed the selection of litigation when examining the causal effects of legal
precedent.
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
We collect a novel dataset of District Court and Circuit Court decisions on piercing
the corporate veil between 2000 and 2004. We combine the information in a way
that provides, for each District Court case, the characteristics of all Circuit Court
judgments rendered in the same Circuit Court while the District Court case was
pending, along with the characteristics of the District Court case. We gather data
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from four different sources: First, we use the Westlaw pleadings database to identify
District Court cases in which a party requested to pierce the corporate veil of an
entity involved in the proceedings. Second, we obtain detailed information on case
dispositions from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Civil Terminations
database (“AOC”). Third, we obtain all Circuit Court decisions related to piercing
the corporate veil from Lexis. Case outcomes for all Circuit Court cases have been
manually coded. Fourth, we obtain the characteristics of all judges involved in the
Circuit Court decisions from data provided by the Federal Judicial Center and our
own data collection. We aggregate information on District Court cases and Circuit
Court judgments to the District Court case level.
For the identification in the Westlaw pleadings database, we follow the methodol-
ogy employed by Boyd and Hoffman (2013). The Westlaw pleadings database contains
“selected pleadings, complaints, and answers filed in State and Federal Courts.” We
identify cases related to piercing the corporate veil on the District Court level by
searching in the Westlaw pleadings database for PCV-related keywords. The exact
search string used is “(“alter ego liability” or pier! /s corpor! /s veil or “unity of
interest” or (corpor! /s (facade or shell or sham or undercapitalized conduit)) and
da(aft 01/01/2000) and da(bef 01/01/2012))”. The filings obtained from the Westlaw
pleadings database consists of over 7000 search results, or 4439 Federal District Court
cases with unique docket numbers. We combine these cases with information from
the AOC civil terminations database. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Civil Terminations database assembles information on all civil cases terminated in
the U.S. Federal District Courts in a certain year.
Table 1 displays information on case numbers and number of cases terminated
by judgment separately for all District Courts that heard at least one case related to
PCV in the observed time period. We observe a high variation in case numbers across
the District Courts, with those District Courts in large population centers generally
showing the highest case numbers.6 This fact is also illustrated by Figure 2.
Data on Circuit Court cases related to PCV were collected by searching in Lexis
6At first glance, it may come as a surprise that the Delaware District Court does show only
low case numbers, given the status of Delaware as the jurisdiction of choice for many corporations.
However, piercing the corporate veil is mostly invoked to hold liable the shareholder of closely
held corporations and the parent companies of corporate subsidiaries. Delaware, by contrast, is
particularly important as the jurisdiction of choice for large companies with a clear separation
between shareholders and managers, in which case PCV normally cannot be invoked.(Thompson,
1991, p. 1052)
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for PCV-related keywords, similar to the method in Sunstein et al. (2006). For each
case, we manually code whether the case was related to PCV, whether the judges
ruled on the merits of the PCV claim, whether the case was decided in favor of the
PCV-seeking party, and whether the judges provided guidance on how to interpret
PCV doctrine in future decisions.7 Table 2 displays this information separately by
each Circuit Court. Note that case numbers vary widely across Circuits. This is in
line with a huge variation in case numbers on the District Court level; see above.
For each Circuit Court case, we obtain the biographical characteristics of the Cir-
cuit Court judges assigned to adjudicate. We assemble these data from the Federal
Judicial Center directory, the Federal Appeals and District Court Attribute datasets
compiled by Zuk, et. al,8 and our own data collection. Our dataset on judges include
their vital statistics, geographic history, education, occupational history, governmen-
tal positions, military service, religion, race, gender, political affiliations, and other
variables.
We link each District Court case with Circuit Court precedent in its jurisdiction.
First, we identify for each District Court case the Circuit Court decisions in the same
Circuit rendered while the District Court case was pending. Second, we aggregate
information on the characteristics of those Circuit Court decisions as well as the
biographical characteristics of the judges involved. Figures 4 to 11 show graphically
the combined information on District Court cases and Circuit Court decisions in
the eight District Courts with the highest case numbers. Horizontal lines represent
District Court cases filed after January 1, 2000, and terminated before December 31,
2004. Black lines represent cases that were decided by judgment. Green dots at the
end of the line indicate that the case was decided at least partly in favor of plaintiff,
while red dots indicate a decision in favor of defendant. Vertical lines represent Circuit
Court judgments issued in the same time period. Red lines represent Circuit Court
judgments denying a claim to pierce the corporate veil, while green lines represent
Circuit Court judgments allowing the requesting party to at least partly pierce the
corporate veil.
The dataset contains, for each District Court case, information on the case out-
come (the manner in which the case was disposed of as well as whether a judgment
favored the plaintiff or the defendant) and on the Circuit Court decisions rendered
7The exact wording of the coding instructions are displayed in Annex B.
8Available at http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.htm
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while the case was pending including biographical characteristics of the Circuit Court
panels. We construct variables as follows:
Termination by judgment This binary variable captures whether a District Court
case was terminated by judgment. We code this variable as 1 any case for
which the AO codes judgment as either 1 (judgment in favor of plaintiff), 2
(judgment in favor of defendant) or 3 (judgment in favor of both). In doing
so, we follow Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999). Note that this means that we
treat both default judgments and judgments on consent as cases terminated by
judgment for the purpose of this study. As documented by Waldfogel (1995)
(p. 379), defendants do prevail in a substantial percentage of cases decided by
default judgment or judgment on consent. Other cases are coded as 0.
Judgment pro plaintiff This binary variable indicates whether the plaintiff at
least partly prevailed in the judgment. Cases for which AOC coded judgment
as 1 or 3 are coded as 1, and cases coded as 2 are coded as 0. Values are
unavailable for cases in which Termination by judgment is 0.
# CC judgments while case pending Count variable for the number of PCV-related
Circuit Court judgments issued in the same Circuit while the District Court case
was pending.
# CC judgments pro PCV Count variable for the number of Circuit Court judgments
pro piercing the corporate veil issued in the same Circuit while the District
Court case was pending.
# CC on the merits Count variable for the number of PCV-related Circuit Court
judgments in the same Circuit deciding on the merits of the PCV claim issued
while the District Court case was pending.
# CC judgments on the merits pro PCV Count variable for the number of Circuit
Court judgments in the same Circuit positively deciding on the merits of the
PCV claim while the District Court case was pending.
Our dataset contains all 425 cases filed on or after January 1, 2000, the date the
Westlaw pleadings database begins, and terminated on or before December 31, 2004,
the date that the public AOC database ends. Summary statistics are provided in
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Table 3. The median case length was 237 days. 18% of these terminated with a
judgment. 18% voted to pierce, but among the cases with a judgment, 68% voted
to pierce. The average case had 1.65 Circuit Court judgments decided at its higher
court during its time frame. 35% were pro-pierce. 0.45 decisions reversed the District
Court. The number and character of intervening Circuit Court cases were similar
for the 78 District cases with judgments, though a slightly higher 0.68 intervening
decisions reversed the District Court.
3 Empirical Analysis
In our empirical analysis, we investigate the influence of Circuit Court decisions issued
while a District Court case was pending. More precisely, we are interested in whether
a Circuit Court decision in favor of the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil
marginally affects the plaintiff’s chances of success in an ongoing proceeding before
the District Court in which PCV is asserted.
Figure 3 depicts this relationship graphically. District Court cases are decided
by light brown lines and green or red dots, depending on whether the District Court
case was decided at least partly in favor of the plaintiff. Circuit Court decisions
rendered while the respective District Court case was pending are represented by
green lines (decisions in favor of piercing) and red lines (decisions against piercing).
Panel (a) includes all Circuit Court decisions, Panel (b) includes only those Circuit
Court decisions that decided on the merits of the PCV claim.
Both figures suggest that there is a relationship between Circuit Court case out-
comes and ensuing decisions by District Court judges. The presence of a negative
decision by the Circuit Court does not seem to have a strong impact on the District
outcome, however: even District Court cases that are decided after three or more
negative decisions by a Circuit Court fairly often end with a decision in favor of the
plaintiff. But the presence of a pro-PCV decision by the Circuit Court seems to
predict plaintiff success fairly well. Of 20 (or 17, if one counts only Circuit Court
decisions on the merits) District Court decisions that were rendered after a Circuit
Court had ruled in favor of piercing the veil, only 3 were fully decided in favor of the
Defendant. Of those District Court proceedings during which a Circuit Court had
not at the same time declined to pierce the veil at least twice, none ended with a
judgment fully in favor of the defendant.
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3.1 Impact of Circuit Court decisions on the outcome of pro-
ceedings pending before the District Courts
We test whether this observed correlation between Circuit Court decisions and the
outcomes of District Court cases is a causal relationship using regression analysis and
instrumental variables. We use the following model:
P (Yitdc = 1|X) = β0 + β1Casesicdt + β2Lawicdt + β3Dd + β4Tt + icdt
Yitdc is a binary variable indicating whether the District Court d ruled at least
partly in favor of claimant i. Casesicdt is a count variable capturing the number of
Circuit Court decisions issued in the same Circuit while the District Court case was
pending. Lawicdt is a count variable for Circuit Court decisions deciding in favor
of a claim to pierce the veil. Dd and Tt are District Court and year fixed effects,
respectively. Subscript i indicates the District Court case, subscript d the District,
subscript c the Circuit, and subscript t the year in which the District Court case was
decided.
The coefficient on Lawicdt describes the effect of a Circuit Court case being decided
in favor of piercing the veil. This variable is our major variable of interest. If judges
were to react to the creation of new precedent by changing their decision standard in
the direction of the precedent, then we should expect a positive value for the coefficient
on Lawicdt. The coefficient on Casesicdt captures the effect of the presence of an anti-
piercing Circuit Court case. Accordingly, we expect the coefficient on Lawicdt to take
on negative values. We use count variables to measure Lawicdt. We acknowledge but
do not use percentages of pro-PCV cases for Lawicdt together with a dummy variable
for Casesicdt indicating whether any Circuit Court case has been decided while the
District Court case was pending). The reason for measuring with counts is to avoid
the mechanical assumption that the marginal effect of an additional Circuit case is
smaller when there are multiple Circuit Court decisions than when there is only one
Circuit Court decision while a District Court case is pending.
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3.1.1 OLS regression
Table 5 Panel A column (1) reports results from an OLS regression including all
Circuit Court cases related to PCV in Casesicdt and Lawicdt.
9 In line with our inter-
pretation of Figure 3, the coefficient for Casesicdt is slightly negative but statistically
insignificant. The point estimate for our main variable of interest, Lawicdt, is 0.291.
That is, judges are on average 29 percentage points more likely to decide in favor
of a plaintiff in a case related to piercing the corporate veil (vote to pierce) when a
decision by the Circuit Court favored PCV. This is a large effect, but consistent with
what we can see in the raw data. The result is at the border of being significant on
the 5% level (p-value: .050). Column (2) reports results from a similar regression
including only those Circuit Court cases in which the District Court decided on the
merits of the PCV claim.10 The coefficient on Lawicdt is highly statistically signifi-
cant, and magnitude of the point estimate is very close to that in column (1). These
results suggest that District Court judges are much more likely (around 30 percentage
points) to adopt a pro-plaintiff decision when a Circuit Court decided in favor of and
not against piercing the corporate veil while the case was pending.
However, these results do not prove a causal explanation in the sense that the
direction of the Circuit Court decision led to a change in the decision standards of
District Court judges. Instead, this OLS regression does no more than evaluate a
correlation between the direction of the Circuit Court judgments and the ensuing
District Court decisions. A priori, it cannot be excluded that such a correlation is
caused by anticipating behavior of the Circuit Courts,11 or by common causes that
make both Circuit Court and District Court judges change their decision behavior
at the same time. Such omitted variables can include political or economic trends
within the appellate jurisdiction.
3.1.2 Instrumental variable regression
We therefore employ an instrumental variable approach in order to isolate the causal
effect of Circuit Court decisions on the decision-making of District Court judges.
We exploit the fact that Circuit Court judges are randomly assigned to cases, and
that individual characteristics of Circuit Court judges, to some extent, predict their
voting behavior. This enables us to use idiosyncratic variation in the demographic
9Variables # CC judgments while case pending and # CC judgments pro PCV
10Variables # CC on the merits and # CC judgments pro PCV, see Section 2.3 above.
11See Boyd et. al (2009), p. 51 Fn. 64.
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composition of Circuit Court panels deciding PCV cases as an instrument for Circuit
Court decisions in favor of or against PCV.
A large literature has documented that judges with different background variables
differ in their decision-making, be it because they differ in their perception of the law,
or because they are influenced by certain political preferences that are unevenly dis-
tributed among judges according to their personal or professional backgrounds. The
biographical variable that has arguably received the most attention in this literature,
the political party of the appointing president, has been documented to predict the
decisions of judges in controversial, politically charged areas of law such as abortion
rights or civil rights. It is also significantly correlated with the votes of judges in
cases involving piercing the corporate veil (Sunstein et al., 2006). One explanation
for this could be that the Republican platform is traditionally pro-business and there-
fore less likely to extend liability to a shareholder of a failed enterprise. An alternative
(and potentially complementary) explanation could be that Democrats might be more
likely to use PCV as a means of enhancing the efficiency of statutory schemes aimed
at fostering policy goals such as environment protection vis-a`-vis corporate actors.
We consider these ideas using our own data and specifications.12 Table 4 reports
the results of first-stage OLS regressions of the number of pro-PCV judgments on bio-
graphic characteristics of the judges involved in the decisions, controlling for the total
number of Circuit Court decisions as well as District and year fixed effects. Column
(1) presents results using the number of Democrat judges in all Circuit Court panels
that rendered a decision while the District Court case was pending as explanatory
variable. While the effect of an increase in the number of Democrat judges in fact
positive, and it is statistically significant (p-value .039), the F-value does not exceed
5.52. Therefore, this variable would be a weak instrument. Column (2) presents es-
timates using the number of panels with different casts of Republican and Democrat
judges as explanatory variables. The three variables are jointly significant (p-value
.0000). The F-value of 26.11 suggests that these variables might not be strong enough
to overcome weak instrument bias in an IV regression, particularly given the small
number of cases used in the analysis. Similarly, limiting the analysis to Circuit Court
12This means that we are not testing the question of whether judicial panels with different de-
mographic composition differ in their likelihood of ruling pro PCV (a model with binary outcome
variable). Instead, we test whether, for the District Court cases in our dataset, differences in the de-
mographic composition of the panels who decided Circuit Court PCV cases lead to different numbers
of Circuit Court decisions pro PCV given the number of Circuit Court decisions.
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decisions that decided on the merits of the PCV claim, we observe F-values of 3.97
and 8.59, respectively, see columns (3) and (4).
To address potential concerns from our theoretically-motivated biographical vari-
ables, we also use LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) to select
instruments from the large number of exogenous variables available to us due to the
richness of information on judge backgrounds (Belloni et al. 2012). LASSO solves two
problems of OLS, the lack of sparseness (resulting in a potential weak instruments
problem) and the lack of continuity. Formally, LASSO minimizes the sum of squares
subject to the sum of the absolute value of the coefficients being less than a constant.
This leads to some coefficients being set to exactly 0, which in turn reduces model
complexity. We consider 30 biographical characteristics13 and their interactions as po-
tential instruments. Combinations of the characteristics of these randomly-assigned
judges and panels would also be orthogonal to the error term. We use not only the
number of judges with particular characteristics involved in decisions as potential
instruments, but also the number of panels with a specific number of judges with a
certain background (for example, how many panels featured exactly one judge who
is wealthy and Catholic).
Table 5 Panel A columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) report the results of instrumental
variable regressions using two different sets of instruments. We use the limited in-
formation maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator because of its better small sample
properties. Model (2) and (5) use the number of panels with different numbers of
democrat judges as an instrument. Including all Circuit Court cases in the analysis,
we see that both Casesic and Lawic react as expected, and that Lawic is again sig-
nificant at the .1% level, although not at the .05% level. However, the large point
estimate for Lawic of .562 (almost twice as high as the point estimate from the OLS
regression) leads us to suspect that the estimate might be inflated due to weak in-
strument bias. The same applies for the model including only Circuit Court cases
deciding on the merits of the PCV claim (column (5)).
This problem is arguably resolved by models (3) and (6), which use the instruments
13Democrat, male, male Democrat, female Republican, minority, black, Jewish, Catholic, No
religion, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, bachelors degree (BA) received from same state of ap-
pointment, BA from a public institution, JD from a public institution, having an LLM or SJD,
elevated from District Court, decade of birth (1910s, 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, or 1950s), appointed
when the President and Congress majority were from the same party, ABA score, above median
wealth, appointed by president from an opposing party, prior Federal judiciary experience, prior law
professor, prior government experience, previous assistant U.S. attorney, and previous U.S. attorney.
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identified by LASSO. We observe that the effect of Law is still large (point estimate:
.406 and .371, respectively). While the effect of Lawic, when including all Circuit
Court cases in the analysis, is significant at the .05% level, it is highly significant
when restricting the analysis to Circuit Court cases deciding on the merits of the
PCV claim (p-value: .006).
3.2 Does the observed relationship indicate a legalistic mo-
tivation?
While these results suggest that District Court judges adjust their decision standards
in reaction to decisions by the Circuit Courts, one can still wonder whether our results
provide evidence for a legalistic motivation of District Court judges. The Circuit
Court decisions in our dataset largely do not rephrase the test that is to be applied
by the District Courts in order to establish whether to pierce the veil. Instead, the
decisions limit themselves to either approving or discarding the application of the test
given the facts at issue in the case. Does an observed shift in decision standards in
reaction to such a decision signal a legalistic motivation of District Court judges?
As a first response, Circuit Courts decide issues of law and should only hear cases
that present novel legal issues and new fact patterns. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007)
show how their decisions continually expand or shrink the space under which subse-
quent actions may be found liable. A second answer to this question depends on the
definition of legal considerations. A formalist understanding of legal considerations
would likely not view such a shift as showing a legalist motivation.14 The “law”,
according to such formalist conceptions, consists only of “rules contained in a well-
defined set of source materials—principally statutes, regulations, contracts, and prior
judicial decisions—[...].”15 A decision by a higher court that does nothing more than
approve or reject the application of a rule that is otherwise left unchanged would
likely not fulfill these criteria. In other words, under formalist conceptions of the law,
as long as the higher court does not change the legal test to be applied, a judge at a
lower court would have not reason to change his decision-making.
A more realistic conception of the law, however, might well view such a change
as driven by legal considerations. According to such conceptions, “actual legal rules”
14Whether any scholar has in fact ever claimed that such a formalist is an accurate description of
judicial behavior is not relevant here.
15(Stephenson, 2009, 193).
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can be broader than “formal legal rules” and encompass any “systematic patterns in
how earlier judges responded to the particular fact patterns that appeared in those
cases.”16 Under this definition, it seems well possible to see the application of pre-
formulated rules to new facts as conveying something about the law. At the same
time, one might ask whether there exists any factor which would not count as a legal
consideration under such a broad definition. In this project, we define the law in
line with the economic approach (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007) as any factor which
cannot be explained by the attitudinal model and related strategic considerations.
Under the attitudinal model, judges’ decisions are exclusively or at least primarily
explained by their political preferences.17 In case of judges at lower courts, a strategic
consideration such as reversal aversion might induce them to decide in line not with
their own political preferences, but with the political preferences of the judges at the
higher courts.18
We contend that the results shown above cannot be explained by such attitudinal-
ist or strategic considerations. The reason for this lies in the mechanism behind the in-
strumental variable estimator used in the analysis. To understand why, consider that
the instrumental variable estimator looks for a correlation between the assignment of
Circuit Court judges with personal characteristics predicting their decision-making
to cases and subsequent decisions by District Court judges in the same Circuit. How-
ever, the assignment of judges in one case, while potentially affecting the outcome
of that case, does not influence the probability of the assignment of any future case
to a particular cast of judges. Therefore, if judges’ decisions were purely driven by
attitudinalist or strategic concerns, the assignment of Circuit Court judges in one
case should not influence the way District Court judges decide cases. What should
influence District Court decision-making instead are retirements or new appointments
to the Circuit Court, or changes in the preferences of sitting judges. In other words,
in a perfect attitudinalist world, judges should not react to a decision by an “outlier
panel.”
In order to provide some additional evidence on whether the results above indicate
a legal motivation, we rerun our regression using a slightly modified dataset. For each
Circuit Court and District Court case, we coded whether it belonged to one of the
16Stephenson (2009, 197 et seq.).
17See, e.g., Segal and Spaeth (1993); Segal and Spaeth (2002).






4. Other Federal statutory law (including CERCLA)
In the regression analysis, we used two variables for Casesic and Lawic, one repre-
senting Circuit Court cases in the same category, and a second one for Circuit Court
cases in a different category. We hypothesize that a legalistic motivation should lead
to higher point estimates for the effect of Circuit Court decisions in the same category,
while we expect cases in different categories to show either no significant effect, or an
effect that is significantly below that of cases in the same category.
The results of this regression analysis are displayed in Table 5 Panel B. The point
estimates are as expected: Lawic shows a positive effect, with the point estimates
for the variable representing cases in the same category considerably higher than the
point estimates for the effect of a decision in a different case category. These effects
are not significant when including all Circuit Court cases in the analysis. When
restricting the analysis to Circuit Court decisions on the merits of a PCV case, the
effects are significant.
When we control for the number of intervening Circuit Court cases issuing rever-
sals and the number of these cases that were pro-piercing, the effect of the substantive
law is unaffected. There is also no strong evidence that pro-piercing precedent has
effects only when there is a reversal.
3.3 Litigant reaction to Circuit Court decisions
Our method holds constant the set of litigated cases and therefore eliminates any
potential effect of the selection of cases for litigation. However, the decisions of
litigants in ongoing proceedings before the District Courts might still challenge the
causal interpretation of our results. If litigants, after a change in law, settle a different
set of cases, comparing the outcome of judgments after decisions in favor of piercing
the corporate veil with decisions declining to pierce the veil might be compromised
by selection bias.
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While we cannot fully exclude a selection effect, we respond to this challenge in
three ways. First, from a theoretical perspective, even if litigants settle, they do so
in the Priest/Klein framework as a response to a shift in the decision standard, and
the expected decision of the District Court. Such behavior would be evidence that
the law (precedent) matters. Second, we expect any reaction in litigants’ decisions
on which cases to settle to a change in legal standards to mitigate the observed
effect of a change in law on success rates. Therefore, even if selection occurs, our
results can still be measuring the lower bound of any effect of legal precedent on the
subsequent decisions of District Court judges. To understand this, consider the basic
Priest/Klein framework. The cases that are most likely to be tried are those with
case quality close to the decision standard. If a shift in decision standard occurs,
selection leads to the centering of cases around the new decision standard, leading
to a more balanced sample of cases (success rate closer to 50%) than if selection still
took place under the old decision standard. Third, the structure of our data allows
us to investigate the effect of precedent on litigants’ decisions empirically. We use
survival analysis to investigate whether a Circuit Court decision leads to an increase
in cases dropping out of litigation. Estimates from Cox regressions show that this
is not the case. Instead, we see fewer cases being terminated in the three months
following a Circuit Court decision than before.
4 Discussion
The results obtained in Section 3 are subject to a number of limitations. The most
important limitation relates to case selection. While our method holds constant the
set of litigated cases and therefore eliminates any potential effect of the selection of
cases for litigation, the decisions of litigants in ongoing proceedings before the District
Courts might still thwart the causal explanation of our results. If litigants, after a
change in law, settle a different set of cases, comparing the outcome of judgments
after decisions in favor of piercing the corporate veil with decisions declining to pierce
the veil might be compromised by selection bias.
While we cannot fully exclude any selection effect, we respond to this challenge in
two ways. First, from a theoretical perspective, we expect any reaction in litigants’
settlement behavior to a change in legal standards to mitigate, and not enforce, the
observed effect on success rates. Therefore, even if selection occurs, our results can
still be interpreted as measuring the lower bound of any effect of legal precedent on
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the subsequent decisions of District Court judges. To understand why, consider the
basic Priest/Klein framework. The cases that are most likely to be tried are those
with case quality close to the decision standard. If a shift in decision standard occurs,
selection leads to the centering of cases around the new decision standard, leading
to a more balanced sample of cases (success rate closer to 50%) than if selection still
took place under the old decision standard.19
Second, the structure of our data allows us to investigate the effect of precedent
on litigants’ decisions empirically. We use survival analysis to investigate whether a
Circuit Court decision leads to an increase in cases dropping out of litigation. An
analysis using Cox regression shows that this is not the case. Instead, if anything,
we see less cases being terminated in the three months following a Circuit Court
decision. One possible explanation for this could be that Circuit Court decisions
create uncertainty among litigants about whether and how the District Court will
adjust its decision-making.
A second limitation relates to our claim that attitudinal and strategic motivations
cannot explain the results observed here. While we control for changes over time and
differences between different Circuit Courts by using year and District Court fixed
effects, there is a theoretical possibility that our results are caused by changes in the
cast of judges over time that affect the composition of the bench at the individual
Circuit Courts differently. This would be the case if a change in District Court
decision-making is caused by a change in the composition of judges at the Circuit
Court, under the additional condition that the different personal characteristics of the
Circuit Court judges deciding PCV cases is not a result of random case assignment,
but also an effect of the changes in the bench. While we cannot fully rule out this
possibility, we point to the fact that all Circuit Court judges are appointed by the
U.S. President and confirmed by the Senate.20 Therefore, we consider it unlikely that
the preferences of the bench develop differently at the same time in a way that can
explain these results. Indeed, our results are robust to controlling for Circuit-specific
time trends and to controlling for characteristics of the composition of judges available
to be assigned.
A last limitation relates to sample size and general concerns about clustering with
small numbers of clusters. The number of District Court cases decided by judgment
19For details, see Klerman and Lee (2013).
20See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_courts_of_appeals.
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between 2000 and 2004 is limited. Our empirical findings build on an empirical
analysis of only N=78 cases. This problem is made worse by the fact that we use
instrumental variable estimation. Instrumental variable estimators are biased, but
consistent. Therefore, while they produce accurate results for large number of cases,
the same might not be true for small datasets. In general, the behavior of instrumental
variable estimators for small datasets is not well understood. We attempt to remedy
this problem by using the limited information maximum likelihood estimator, which
reportedly has better finite-sample properties compared to the standard two-stage
least-squares estimator.21 However, we cannot exclude that the results reported are
overconfident. Similarly, we refer to the possibility that clustered standard errors
might result in overconfident results in case of small numbers of clusters, particularly
if the clusters are unbalanced.22 However, given the strongly significant results, we
are confident that neither an upwards biased point estimate resulting from the use of
instrumental variable regression on a small dataset, nor a downwards biased estimate
for the standard errors resulting from clustering techniques can fully explain our
results.
5 Conclusion
In this project, we present a novel approach to examining the functioning of a hi-
erarchical legal system. Our research can be seen as a contribution to the growing
literature about the motivations of public agents and the measurement of legal change.
At the same time, we aim at answering a number of questions related to the drivers
of judicial decision-making as well as the behavior of litigants in ongoing proceedings.
We show that District Court judges react to Circuit Court precedent by adjusting
their decision standard in the direction of the precedent. By looking only at cases that
have been initiated before, but terminated after the decision in the Circuit Court case
was rendered, we hold constant the case sample and avoid the potentially blurring
effects of the selection of cases for litigation. We exploit random assignment of Circuit
Court judges and the predictive power of biographical characteristics to control for
reverse causality and omitted variable bias.
Our investigation of piercing the corporate veil cases from 2000 to 2004 shows
that District Court judges are more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff after a pro-
21Cameron and Trivedi (2010, 204).
22See generally Cameron and Miller (2015).
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piercing Circuit decision. This effect is large — our estimates show a shift in success
rates between 29 and 40 percentage points. The results of our instrumental variable
regression suggest that this effect warrants a causal interpretation. This effect is
highly statistically significant (p-value .006) when restricting the analysis to Circuit
Court cases that decided on the merits of the PCV claim.
Measuring whether and why public agents follow the law is challenging. Distin-
guishing duty from self-interested motivations is generally difficult with observational
data. Besides the issue of endogeneity of high court decisions (Boyd and Spriggs II
2009), the composition of cases coming before the court can change because litigants
may anticipate how the court will resolve the case and adjust their rates of settlement
(Priest and Klein, 1984). Thus one cannot make causal inferences by simply compar-
ing success rates before and after the change in law.23 We proposed a research design
to study whether public agents follow the law rather than being motivated solely
out of self-interest (Posner, 1973; Cameron, 1993; Kornhauser, 1999). Understanding
when normative commitments are influenced by external factors is a relevant area of
future research.24
23See, however, Klerman and Lee (2013) for an investigation into the assumptions necessary to
infer from a change in success rates whether a change in decision standards has occurred.
24Modeling how incentives interact with duties (Chen and Lind, 2007, 2014), group conflict (Chen,
2014, 2006, 2010), norms (Chen, 2004, 2011; Chen et al., 2014), and human rights (Chen, 2015; Chen
and Yeh, 2014) may be a fruitful direction.
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Annex A – Tables and Figures
Table 1: PCV cases in the Federal District Courts - 2000-2004
District Cases Judgments District Cases Judgments District Cases Judgments
D.Me 3 0 N.D.Fla. 1 0 E.D.Wis. 2 0
D.Mass 7 1 M.D.Fla. 28 2 W.D.Wis. 1 0
D.N.H. 2 0 S.D.Fla. 50 8 E.D.Ark. 6 2
D.Conn. 2 0 N.D.Ga. 6 0 S.D.Iowa 1 0
N.D.N.Y. 2 0 S.D.Ga. 2 0 D.Minn. 1 0
E.D.N.Y. 3 2 E.D.La. 9 3 E.D.Mo. 5 0
S.D.N.Y. 16 6 M.D.La. 1 0 W.D.Mo. 5 0
W.D.N.Y. 2 1 W.D.La. 2 0 D.Neb. 1 1
D.N.J. 4 0 S.D.Miss. 1 0 D.S.D. 1 0
E.D.Pa. 14 2 N.D.Tex. 10 2 D.Ariz. 1 0
M.D.Pa. 2 1 E.D.Tex. 3 0 C.D.Cal. 4 0
D.Md. 6 2 S.D.Tex. 9 1 S.D.Cal. 22 7
E.D.N.C. 1 1 E.D.Ky. 3 1 D.Nev. 24 6
M.D.N.C. 3 1 W.D.Ky. 1 0 D.Or. 2 2
W.D.B.C. 7 0 E.D.Mich. 1 0 E.D.Wash. 5 0
D.S.C. 8 0 W.D.Mich. 1 0 W.D.Wash. 14 0
E.D.Va. 1 0 N.D.Ohio 14 3 D.Colo. 1 1
N.D.W.Va. 1 0 S.D.Ohio 3 0 D.Kan. 1 0
S.D.W.Va. 1 0 E.D.Tenn. 1 0 N.D.Okla. 3 0
N.D.Ala. 4 0 N.D.Ill. 87 25 W.D.Okla. 3 1
M.D.Ala. 1 0 N.D.Ind. 2 1 D.Utah 8 0
S.D.Ala. 2 1 S.D.Ind. 2 1 D.D.C. 2 1
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Table 2: PCV cases at the Circuit Courts – 2000-2004
Circuit Judgments on PCV Judgments on merits of PCV claim PCV judgments reversing DC
# Judgments # Pro Plaintiff # Judgments # Pro Plaintiff # Judgments # Pro Plaintiff
Fed. 1 0 1 0 0 0
D.C. 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 6 2 5 2 1 0
2 13 1 9 1 4 4
3 11 4 10 4 1 1
4 3 0 3 0 1 1
5 17 6 16 5 8 7
6 9 5 8 5 3 2
7 9 2 7 1 6 4
8 4 1 4 1 1 1
9 14 6 14 6 2 2
10 3 2 2 2 1 0
11 5 2 2 1 0 0
TOTAL 96 31 82 28 28 22
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
All cases (N=425)
Days pending 1.00 124.00 237.00 316.10 412.00 1399.00
Termination by judgment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00
Judgment pro plaintiff 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00
# CC judgm. while case pending 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.65 2.00 12.00
- of which pro PCV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 1.00 5.00
- of which % pro PCV 0.00 0.00 50.00 35.20 50.00 100.00
# CC judgments on the merits 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.43 2.00 12.00
- of which pro PCV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 1.00 5.00
# CC judgments reversing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 1.00 5.00
- of which pro PCV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 2.00
Judgments only (N=78)
Days pending 13.00 144.00 263.50 340.40 479.00 1243.00
Termination by judgment 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Judgment pro plaintiff 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.68 1.00 1.00
# CC judgm. while case pending 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.68 2.75 8.00
- of which pro PCV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.75 4.00
- of which % pro PCV 0.00 0.00 33.33 29.46 50.00 100.00
# CC judgments on the merits 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.42 2.00 8.00
- of which pro PCV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 4.00
# CC judgments reversing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 1.00 4.00
- of which pro PCV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 2.00
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Table 4: First stage OLS regression
Outcome: # pro-PCV judgments
by the Circuit Court
all judgments on merits only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cases 0.115 0.164 0.0948 0.101
(0.426) (0.263) (0.597) (0.599)
# of democrat judges in panels 0.141∗ 0.177
(0.039) (0.072)
# of panels with 1 democrat judge -0.0984 0.0968
(0.656) (0.639)
# of panels with 2 democrat judges 0.436∗ 0.374∗
(0.026) (0.018)
# of panels with 3 democrat judges 0.0270 -0.0301
(0.948) (0.868)
cons 1.041∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ 0.269 0.259
(0.000) (0.000) (0.471) (0.439)
F -statistics of instruments 5.52∗ 26.11∗∗∗ 3.97 8.59∗∗
N 78 78 78 78
p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the Circuit level. Dependent variable: count
variable for the number of pro-PCV decisions by the Circuit Courts.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Regression estimates
Panel A: All Circuit Court Judgments combined
Outcome: Pro-plaintiff District Court judgment
all Circuit Court judgments judgments on merits only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS LIML 1 LIML 2 OLS LIML 1 LIML 2
Cases -0.0869 -0.123 -0.110 -0.0905 -0.186∗∗ -0.115
(0.350) (0.208) (0.318) (0.161) (0.001) (0.140)
Law 0.291 0.562 0.406∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗ 0.371∗∗
(0.050) (0.087) (0.033) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006)
cons 0.934∗∗ 0.580 0.784∗ 1.140∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.276) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F (First stage) - 26.11 139.25 - 8.59 334.67
N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Panel B: Circuit Court Judgments by Legal Area
Outcome: Pro-plaintiff District Court judgment
all Circuit Court judgments judgments on merits only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS LIML 1 LIML 2 OLS LIML 1 LIML 2
Cases (same area) -0.143 -0.225 -0.142 -0.078 -0.086 -0.065
(0.089) (0.148) (0.219) (0.453) (0.496) (0.466)
Cases (different area) -0.066 -0.110 -0.145 -0.139 -0.188 -0.190
(0.541) (0.459) (0.140) (0.053) (0.158) (0.055)
Law (same area) 0.675 1.221 0.733 0.845 0.961 0.795∗
(0.124) (0.118) (0.268) (0.086) (0.078) (0.045)
Law (different area) 0.186 0.254 0.401 0.267∗∗ 0.374 0.399∗∗
(0.263) (0.424) (0.194) (0.007) (0.202) (0.011)
cons 0.784∗ 0.392 0.565 1.034∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.526) (0.164) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the Circuit level.
IV estimates: p-values based on small sample t-statistics. District and Year F.E. included. Dependent
variable: Dummy indicating whether District Court decided at least partly in favor of claimant.
Observation level: District Court judgment. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Figure 1: Geographical boundaries of Circuits and Districts
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Figure 2: PCV cases by District Court
Number of judgments
Number of other cases
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Figure 3: District Court judgments after Circuit Court decisions
(a) All Circuit Court decisions (b) Circuit Court decisions on the merits only
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Figure 4: Combined information on DC and CC cases in the District of Nevada
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Figure 5: Combined information on DC and CC cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
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Figure 6: Combined information on DC and CC cases in the Northern District of Illinois
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Figure 7: Combined information on DC and CC cases in the Northern District of Ohio
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Figure 8: Combined information on DC and CC cases in the Southern District of California
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Figure 9: Combined information on DC and CC cases in the Southern District of Florida
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Figure 10: Combined information on DC and CC cases in the Southern District of New York
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Figure 11: Combined information on DC and CC cases in the Southern District of Ohio
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